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Norman Cousins' Practice of Private Diplomacy within the Japan−U.S. Intellectual Interchange Program

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Introduction

It has long been recognized that "citizen diplomacy" played a significant role in Japan−U.S. relations during the Cold War. A number of organizations and programs—including the Japan−U.S. Intellectual Interchange Program (hereafter, IIP), the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Asia Foundation, which received funding from the CIA—have been identified in prior research as having contributed to this dynamic. These studies have demonstrated that various actors from both Japan and the United States were engaged in fierce competition to gain the support of the other side within the broader geopolitical context of the Cold War. As Moriguchi (Tsuchiya) Yuka has noted, what unfolded beneath the surface of the cultural Cold War was, in essence, a "battle for hearts and minds" aimed at outmaneuvering the influence of communist forces.[1]

The first major empirical contribution on the aforementioned Japan−U.S. IIP was made by Fujita Fumiko, who clarified the actual operations of the project. According to her research, both the Japanese and American Intellectual Interchange Committees responsible for selecting exchange participants experienced friction over candidate selection and control of the initiative. Furthermore, linguistic barriers and ideological tensions—particularly surrounding Marxism—hampered the effectiveness of the exchange. As a result, the program did not achieve the level of political impact that had initially been anticipated. Nonetheless, Fujita argues that, in cultural terms, the program succeeded in enhancing Japan's presence in the United States and held value as a vehicle for mutual exchange.[2] In his work on early postwar Japan−U.S. relations, Matsuda Takeshi emphasizes the role of Saxton Bradford, then Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Japan, in proposing the creation of the intellectual interchange initiative. Matsuda situates the program as a strategic effort to prevent the

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1. Moriguchi (Tsuchiya) Yuka, *Shinbei Nihon no kōchiku: Amerika no Tainichi jōhō・kyōiku seisaku to Nihon senryō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2009), 9.

2. Fujita Fumiko, *Amerika bunka gaikō to Nihon: Reisenki no bunka to hito no kōryū* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2015), 201−36.

intellectual class in Japan from turning anti-American.[3] Nakajima Hiroo underscores the continuity between this postwar initiative and prewar intellectual exchanges, such as those conducted by the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), which had been spearheaded by pro-American figures, including Nitobe Inazō.[4] Kusunoki Ayako argues that the mobilization of both governmental and nongovernmental American efforts to attract Japanese intellectuals—together with independent anti-Marxist cultural initiatives largely driven by Japanese business circles—culminated in the establishment of the Shimoda Conference in 1967 as a significant site of exchange.[5] Saitō Takaharu has further assessed that the human networks cultivated through the Japan–U.S. IIP may well have provided the foundations for CULCON, an organization formed to strengthen Japan–U.S. cultural and educational relations in the 1960s.[6]

Nevertheless, in the study of Japan–U.S. cultural diplomacy, which primarily focused on interpersonal exchanges, insufficient attention has been paid to the roles played by the individual intellectuals who constituted the core of such exchanges, as well as to their personal motives for engaging in cultural diplomacy. Within the Japan–U.S. IIP, over fifty individuals were invited or dispatched between 1952 and 1996 to engage in lectures and cultural activities.[7] Yet little scrutiny has been given to the political intentions underlying their participation, the messages they conveyed, or their visions for the future of Japan–U.S. relations. Moreover, there has been a lack of focus on the ideological continuity between these individuals' prior beliefs and their involvement in the program. For instance, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt—one of the most prominent figures among those who visited Japan—has been discussed in Fujita's work in connection with the atomic bombing and the Japanese liberal community. However, the relationship between her prewar and wartime thought and activism and her role in the Japan–U.S. IIP, including the significance of her involvement within that broader context, has yet to be thoroughly examined.[8] Thus, investigating the

3. Matsuda Takeshi, *Taibei izon no kigen: Amerika no sofuto pawā senryaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 132–36.

4. Nakajima Hiroo, "Taiheiyō sensōgo no chiteki kōryū no saisei: Amerika kenkyūsha to Rokkufērā zaidan," in *Gurōbaru hisutorī to sensō*, ed. Akita Shigeru (Osaka: Osaka University Press, 2016), 79–105; Nakajima Hiroo, "Takagi Yasaka to sengo no chiteki kōryū no saisei: Amerika kenkyū to no kankei o chūshin ni," *Amerika Taiheiyō kenkyū*, vol. 22 (2022): 29–36.

5. Kusunoki Ayako, "Reisen to Nichibei chiteki kōryū: Shimoda Kaigi (1967) no ichikōsatsu," *Kokusai gaku kenkyū*, vol. 3, no. 1 (2014): 31–44.

6. Saitō Takaharu, "A Short History of CULCON: The Post-War Exchange of Intellectuals Between Japan and the United States," Japan Foundation, n.d. https://www.jpf.go.jp/culcon/about/files/pdf/history_en.pdf.

7. Katō Mikio, ed., *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan gojūnen no ayumi: 1952–2002 zōho kaitei ban* (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Kaikan, 2003), 357–58.

8. Fujita, *Amerika bunka gaikō*, 223–29. To the best of the present author's knowledge,

ideological continuity before and after the participation of each individual in the program remains a major task. A more precise understanding of this dimension would allow for a more nuanced assessment of the political influence exerted through the Japan–U.S. IIP.

Among the visitors to Japan, one of the most distinctive figures was Norman Cousins, editor-in-chief of the book review magazine *The Saturday Review*. At the age of 38, he was notably younger than most of the American participants in the program. At the same time, his relationship with the U.S. government was more ambiguous than that of many of his counterparts. Since the atomic bombings of 1945, Cousins had consistently emphasized the inadequacies of national sovereignty as a basis for security and had devoted his life to advocating for the establishment of a single, powerful world government. In line with this conviction, his unprecedented "revisionist" view of the atomic bombings—first published in 1946—so infuriated officials at the highest levels of government that it directly prompted former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to write his now-famous article defending the atomic bombings, widely referred to as the "Stimson Essay."[9] Furthermore, the Moral Adoption Program initiated in 1949 to support children affected by the atomic bomb across Japan and the United States—an initiative in which Cousins played a central role—stood in direct opposition to the nontreatment policy of the U.S. government and the Occupation authorities regarding *hibakusha*.[10] Nevertheless, Cousins had also maintained connections with the government, having worked during World War II for the United States Office of War Information (OWI), where he engaged in propaganda efforts against Nazi Germany.[11]

In academic discourse, Norman Cousins has often been discussed primarily in connection with post-1945 pacifist movements and anti-nuclear activism. However, recent scholarship has increasingly turned its attention to the exercise of

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the only exception within the Japan–U.S. IIP in which serious consideration has been given to an individual's thought and behavior before and after their visit is that of Robert Oppenheimer, often referred to as the "father of the atomic bomb." Oppenheimer's visit to Japan—the very country upon which the bomb had been dropped—and the questions of what he said and what he felt during that visit garnered significant attention, not only within academic circles but also in the broader media.

9. Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 448–50.

10. Uchiwa Masashi, "Seishinteki yōshi engumi seido saikō: Nōman Kazunsu ni yoru sekai renpō undō no kanten kara," *Amerika-shi hyōron*, vol. 40 (2023): 1–21. The Moral Adoption Program was a system in which American "moral" foster parents provided financial support (at a rate of $2.25 per month) to children who had become orphans as a result of the atomic bombings.

11. Allen Pietrobon, *Norman Cousins: Peacemaker in the Atomic Age* (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023), 23–24.

his "private" diplomatic agency.[12] Lawrence S. Wittner, a leading authority on the history of the anti-nuclear movement, has reevaluated Cousins' role in the 1963 U.S.−Soviet negotiations over the Partial Test Ban Treaty from the perspective of citizen diplomacy.[13] Further advancing this line of inquiry, Allen Pietrobon—who pioneered the study of Cousins' private diplomacy—demonstrated that in the "Hiroshima Maidens" support project, Cousins pursued a course that ran counter to the official position of the U.S. State Department, yet ultimately succeeded in securing President Dwight D. Eisenhower's approval for the project, thereby affirming the effectiveness of his private diplomacy.[14] Building on Pietrobon's research, Uchiwa Masashi has argued that Cousins' practice of private diplomacy can in fact be traced back to 1949, during the implementation of the Moral Adoption Program, predating the "Hiroshima Maidens" support initiative.[15] Although many specific questions remain regarding when and how Cousins began exercising private diplomacy, there is growing scholarly consensus that he wielded significant informal diplomatic influence during the early Cold War period. This article adopts and builds upon the analytical framework developed in this body of research on private diplomacy.

At this juncture, it is necessary to define the concept of "private diplomacy" as employed here. As articulated by Giles Scott-Smith in his synthesis of various case studies on private diplomacy, the term refers to "input and influence of particular individuals in international relations who were able to pursue their own agendas either in alliance with, separate from, or sometimes against the interests of states."[16] Accordingly, private diplomacy can be situated within the broader category of citizen diplomacy as a form of unofficial diplomatic activity. However, by foregrounding the individual's intentions and objectives, it constitutes a more narrowly defined subcategory of citizen diplomacy. In this respect, the Moral Adoption Program and the "Hiroshima Maidens" relief initiative—both of which have been discussed in prior scholarship—serve as exemplary cases of private diplomacy, as they reflect Cousins' pursuit of independent efforts to aid atomic bomb survivors, efforts that diverged entirely from official U.S. government policy.

This article examines the case of Norman Cousins, an American journalist who

12. For an overview of the trajectory of research on Cousins, see Uchiwa Masashi, "Dainiji taisen-go shoki no Nōman Kazunsu no sekai renpō undō to genbaku tōkakan: Puraibēto dipuromashī e no michi," *Kokusai kōkyō seisaku kenkyū*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2020): 54−56.

13. Lawrence S. Wittner, "Norman Cousins and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 42 (2012): 10−34.

14. Allen Pietrobon, "Humanitarian Aid or Private Diplomacy? Norman Cousins and the Treatment of Atomic Bomb Victims," *New Global Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (2014): 121−40.

15. Uchiwa, "Seishinteki yōshi," 12−16.

16. Giles Scott-Smith, "Introduction: Private Diplomacy, Making the Citizen Visible," *New Global Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (2014): 1.

visited Japan in 1953 under the Japan–U.S. IIP, and bridges the gap between existing scholarship on the Japan–U.S. IIP and more recent studies on Cousins that emphasize his role in private diplomacy. To state the conclusion in advance: the analysis presented in this article reveals a significant correlation between the Japan–U.S. IIP and Cousins' practice of private diplomacy. The programs carried out under the interchange initiative were heavily influenced by Cousins' prior diplomatic efforts as a private citizen, and during the course of the initiative, he steered the exchange toward a more proactive engagement with atomic bomb survivor relief efforts. Cousins' active commitment to addressing the profoundly sensitive issue of the atomic bomb cannot be fully understood within the conventional framework of citizen diplomacy shaped around anti-communism as the common motivation of key actors such as Matsumoto Shigeharu and John D. Rockefeller III. Although rarely noted in earlier research, the political and intellectual commitments of participating intellectuals prior to the interchange itself had a significant impact on the program, and—as in Cousins' subsequent promotion of the "Hiroshima Maidens" relief project—their engagement in Japan at times influenced their later activities as well. The case of Cousins thus highlights not only the importance of the "private" actor in studies of the Japan–U.S. IIP, but also the necessity of taking into account the intellectual and activist trajectories of participants both before and after their involvement in the program.

A brief note should be added here on the appropriateness of selecting Cousins as the subject of this case study. As will be discussed below, his selection as a delegate was in some respects a compromise and bore exceptional characteristics. Nevertheless, in the early stages of the Japan–U.S. IIP, when securing consent from prospective delegates proved exceedingly difficult, even other participants were not always chosen in accordance with the preferences of the Japanese and American Committees. Moreover, in a study such as this one, which seeks to analyze the political effects of the Interchange, Cousins provides a particularly apt case. From the standpoint of available sources as well, Cousins' activities are especially suitable for analysis, given the existence of detailed records preserved on his side.

The structure of this article is as follows. Section I outlines the origins of the Japan–U.S. IIP and addresses the issue of participant selection. Section II examines the distinctiveness of Cousins' agenda during his visit to Japan and demonstrates how his private diplomacy was enacted within the framework of the program by elucidating the connection between the "Hiroshima Maidens" relief project and the IIP. Section III provides a discourse analysis of Cousins' activities during the program. Throughout his visit, Cousins held meetings and delivered lectures at various universities and institutions across Japan. This section analyzes the content of those engagements to reveal the ideas he presented and the discourses he sought to share. Based on these discussions, the conclusion offers a synthesis of the findings and presents new insights gained from linking the study

of the Japan–U.S. IIP with research on Cousins' practice of private diplomacy.

I: The Launch of the Japan–U.S. IIP and the Selection of Participants

1. The Inception of the Japan–U.S. IIP

In 1951, as the restoration of Japanese sovereignty approached, the issue of postwar Japan's orientation toward the West—achieved not through coercive means but through cultural influence—became an urgent matter for the United States in a different sense than during the wartime period. To address this challenge, John Foster Dulles, who served as the special envoy for the peace treaty negotiations, appointed John D. Rockefeller III as the cultural advisor to the peace mission. From January 25 to February 22, 1951, Rockefeller visited Japan, where he consulted with his Japanese counterparts on the future agenda of cultural exchange in the post-treaty era.[17]

On February 16, Rockefeller III was reunited with two longtime acquaintances, Matsumoto Shigeharu and Takagi Yasaka.[18] Rockefeller and Matsumoto had first developed a close friendship during the third Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) conference held in 1929, where they served respectively as secretary to the American delegation and as a member of the conference's administrative staff. During their 1951 meeting, Takagi briefed Rockefeller on the current situation among Japanese intellectuals, emphasizing the need to firmly establish democratic values within a community shaken by the Reverse Course and the contentious peace treaty negotiations.[19] In addition, they exchanged views on the creation of a Japan–U.S. Cultural Center.[20] The Japanese participants, including Matsumoto, proposed a vision for a cultural exchange center equipped with meeting facilities and a library, and sought financial support from the American side. While Rockefeller responded positively to the proposal, he expressed concern that government funding might be perceived as propagandistic and instead favored securing resources through private-sector channels.[21]

Rockefeller III's commitment to promoting equitable cultural exchange with an independent Japan on a private basis is clearly reflected in the memorandum

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17. John D. Rockefeller III, *Rockefeller III Diaries (1951)*, January 24 and 25 to February 22, 1951, John D. Rockefeller III Papers. Rockefeller Archive Center, New York (hereafter RAC).

18. Ibid.

19. Katō Mikio, *Rokkufērā-ke to Nihon: Nichibei kōryū o tsumuida hitobito* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 137–38.

20. John D. Rockefeller III, "Diary Trip to India and the Far East 2 January–5 March 1951," February 26, 1951, Rockefeller Foundation Records, Officers' Diaries, RG 12, F–L, Fahs, Charles B., RAC.

21. Ibid.

titled "U.S.−Japanese Cultural Relations," which he submitted to Dulles in April of the same year. The section of this memorandum advocating for a "two-way street" cultural exchange between the United States and Japan is widely known.[22] Another notable aspect of the memorandum is its emphasis on prioritizing outreach to intellectuals in Japan−U.S. cultural exchange initiatives. He identified the target of these efforts as "the group in the Japanese population that may be rather loosely designated as the intellectual leadership of the country." Furthermore, he proposed that "since, in Japan particularly, the mass groups are guided and influenced by their leaders, it is recommended that substantial emphasis be placed on reaching those leaders."[23]

This emphasis on engaging with intellectuals was aligned with the U.S. government's cultural public relations strategy toward Japan at the time. An annex to NSC 68/3, dated December 8, 1950, which outlined the United States' foreign policy strategy for the following five years, established a section on "The Foreign Information Programs." It defined the purpose of foreign information and educational exchange as follows: "The task of the United States foreign information and educational exchange programs is to assure that the psychological implications of these actions are, first, fully developed and second, effectively conveyed to the minds and the emotions of groups and individuals who may importantly influence governmental action and popular attitudes in other nations and among other peoples."[24] The Far East was explicitly identified as one of the regions of focus, and regardless of whether the countries concerned had authoritarian or democratic regimes, the target class for these programs was defined as intellectuals, due to their high degree of influence over the general public.[25] These considerations demonstrate that using "cultural exchange" as a means of drawing Japanese intellectuals toward the West was regarded as a matter of critical importance at the time.

Following the submission of the memorandum to Dulles, both the Japanese and American committees approved the implementation of the Japan−U.S. IIP in advance of the establishment of the International House of Japan. On the American side, the committee was placed under the aegis of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, with Harry J. Carman assuming responsibility for its administrative operations. A central issue in the implementation of the intellectual interchange was the selection of appropriate

22. John D. Rockefeller III, "U.S.−Japanese Cultural Relations," n.d., Japanese Peace Treaty−Dulles Mission; 1951, Rockefeller Family Public Relations Department Papers, Series 1−9, General−Foreign, Series 5, RAC.

23. Ibid.

24. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*. Document 145. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d145.

25. Ibid.

individuals. Correspondence between the two committees at the time reveals that, beyond just the question of personnel selection, other concerns included the number of participants, the intervals at which exchanges would occur, and which committee would take the lead in selecting candidates. However, this section will focus specifically on the matter of personnel selection, examining the process by which Norman Cousins was chosen and the significance of that decision.

2. Selection of Intellectual Delegates: Norman Cousins

Prior to the establishment of the International House of Japan, the Japan–U.S. IIP was launched; however, the selection of appropriate delegates to be dispatched by each side proved to be a major challenge. In her earlier study, Fujita demonstrated that the American Committee expressed concerns about the list of Japanese delegates submitted by the Japanese side, particularly regarding the "homogeneity" of the candidates in terms of their political orientation and age.[26] While Fujita's study did not fully address this issue, the selection process for American delegates to Japan was similarly fraught with difficulties.

Before examining the list of proposed visitors to Japan discussed within the Japan–U.S. Intellectual Interchange Committee, it is instructive to consider a key antecedent to the implementation of the IIP—Bradford's memorandum, "Top Priority Need for American Intellectuals Immediately in Japan; Japanese to the United States." Sent from Bradford to John D. Rockefeller III on November 17, 1951, the memorandum emphasized the influence that intellectuals held within Japanese society. At the same time, it warned that these individuals were becoming increasingly drawn to communism. In response, the memorandum urgently advocated for providing Japanese intellectuals with opportunities to visit the United States and acquire "accurate" knowledge about the country, framing this as a matter of immediate priority.[27]

In conjunction with the arguments outlined above, the same document includes a list of appropriate and effective American intellectuals who could help achieve its stated objectives. Among those recommended are James Bryant Conant, President of Harvard University; Alfred Whitney Griswold, President of Yale University; and the poet Robert L. Frost.[28] Of particular note is Conant, whose name appears at the top of the list and whom Bradford endorses as someone who "can meet the university presidents on their own round and give an inspired interpretative explanation of what is going on in the United States today."[29] One

26. Fujita, *Amerika bunka gaikō*, 210–11.

27. Saxton Bradford, "Top Priority Need for American Intellectuals Immediately in Japan; Japanese to the United States," November 17, 1951, OMR Record, Box 59, Folder 416, RAC.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

intriguing aspect of this list is the inclusion of Eleanor Roosevelt, who does not appear in the subsequent roster prepared by the Japan−U.S. Intellectual Interchange Committee.[30] Given that the majority of invitees to Japan were figures from the academic world, her eventual visit may be understood as reflecting the expectation that her philanthropic work and advocacy for women's rights would contribute to fostering pro-American sentiment among Japanese intellectuals—an aim consistent with the objectives of the memorandum. It is plausible to conclude that this recommendation played a role in her later invitation under the framework of the Japan−U.S. IIP. Notably, Norman Cousins does not appear on Bradford's list, suggesting that Bradford may have considered Cousins unlikely to yield the desired impact in Japan.

Returning to our focus on the Japan−U.S. Intellectual Interchange Committee, the selection of American visitors to Japan was carried out not unilaterally by the American Committee, but rather through a process reflecting John D. Rockefeller III's philosophy of a "two-way street" cultural exchange. In accordance with this principle, the Japanese Committee was to submit a list of preferred candidates. At the second meeting of the Japanese Committee, held on March 18, 1952, participants included Hugh Borton, Maeda Tamon, and Takagi Yasaka, among others.[31] During this meeting, the committee finalized two lists to be submitted to Columbia University: a first-priority group consisting of six individuals and a second-priority group consisting of five. The first-priority list included Ralph Johnson Bunche, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and diplomat; David Lilienthal, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; Arnold Joseph Toynbee, a prominent historian; Reinhold Niebuhr, a noted theologian; David Sarnoff, a leading business executive; and Archibald MacLeish, a poet who had also served as Assistant Secretary of State.[32] The second-priority list featured figures such as Robert J. Oppenheimer and the poet T. S. Eliot.[33] Significantly, Norman Cousins—who would eventually become one of the earliest American visitors under the IIP—was not included on either list at this stage, not even among the second-priority candidates.

Having failed to secure the consent of all the individuals on the aforementioned first- and second-priority lists, the Japanese Committee compiled a third list of candidates at its seventh meeting, held on May 28 of the same year. This third list included Charles W. Cole, who would become one of the earliest American visitors under the IIP; Leonard Bernstein, the renowned conductor; and Anne

30. Ibid.

31. "Japan Committee for Intellectual Interchange Minutes of the Second Meeting," March 18, 1952, Harry J. Carman papers, Series III, 1950−1956, Box 24, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, New York (hereafter HJCP).

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

O'Hare McCormick, a Pulitzer Prize-winning female journalist.[34] Yet, even at this stage, Norman Cousins' name still did not appear on the list.

According to an explanation provided by Matsumoto Shigeharu during an informal meeting of the Japan−U.S. Intellectual Interchange Committee, Cousins' name was proposed to the Japanese Committee because it was included in a list of forty American individuals submitted by Columbia University. This list had been compiled by Columbia, focusing primarily on younger individuals who were deemed "likely to agree to travel" to Japan.[35] According to Carman's account, this list was subsequently narrowed down to eight candidates, one of whom was Cousins.[36] What, then, was the intent behind Matsumoto and his colleagues' decision to select Norman Cousins?

One reason for Cousins' selection was the continued failure to obtain acceptances from the proposed invitees, even after the committee had moved on to its third list of candidates. Particularly troubling was the complete lack of consent from individuals in the literary field. This represented a significant divergence from the original vision held by figures such as Takagi and Matsumoto, who had anticipated that at least one of the two or three initial visitors would be a literary figure.[37] By the time Cousins agreed to the proposal, not a single literary intellectual had accepted an invitation. Furthermore, until the IIP was transferred to the International House of Japan in 1961, not a single literary figure had actually made the visit to Japan.

Under such circumstances, Cousins proved to be a highly opportune candidate. As editor-in-chief of the literary review magazine *The Saturday Review*, he maintained personal relationships with several figures who were highly sought after as potential delegates for the Japan−U.S. IIP, including Archibald MacLeish, Robert Frost, and Lewis Mumford. It is not difficult to surmise that Japanese officials involved in the program anticipated that, through Cousins, they might gain a general understanding of the contemporary landscape of American literature. Indeed, the itinerary for Cousins' visit to Japan included engagements such as a visit to the Japan PEN Club, meetings with Japanese novelists, and a tour of the National Diet Library.[38]

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34. "Japan Committee for Intellectual Interchange Minutes of the Seventh Meeting," May 28, 1952, Harry J. Carman papers, Series III, 1950−1956, Box 24, HJCP.

35. Wada Atsuhiko, "Sengo kokusai bunka seisaku ni tsuite no hikōshiki kondankai kiroku: Kokusai Bunka Kaikan kankei bunsho (bungei hyōronka hen)," *Riterashī-shi kenkyū*, vol. 4 (2011): 80.

36. Harry J. Carman, "Harry J. Carman to Norman Cousins," August 13, 1952, Cataloged Correspondence, Cousins, Norman To Carman, 1952−1954, 3 t.1.s., HJCP.

37. Matsumoto Shigeharu, "Matsumoto Shigeharu to John D. Rockefeller Ⅲ," January 28, 1952, OMR Record, Box 60, Folder 422, RAC.

38. "Revised Schedule for Mr. and Mrs. Norman Cousins," n.d., Box 330, Folder 4, Japan−1953, Norman Cousins Papers, Box 330, Folder 4, Japan−1953, Department of Special

Furthermore, the fact that Cousins had already been actively involved in the implementation of the Moral Adoption Program served as an additional point in favor of his candidacy for the Japanese Committee. *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan jūnen no ayumi* (A Decade of the International House of Japan) describes him as "respected as an advocate of the Moral Adoption Movement."[39]

On August 13, 1952, Cousins was approached by Carmen with an invitation to visit Japan as part of the Japan−U.S. IIP, and on February 16 of the following year, he formally accepted the offer.[40] In addition to discussing the timing of his visit, Cousins requested that his itinerary include a visit to Hiroshima along with related programs.[41] While this marked the realization of Cousins' visit to Japan, it can be said that the inclusion of programs related to Hiroshima and Nagasaki—exceptional within the broader context of the Japan−U.S. intellectual exchange—was the result of his own initiative.

The grand design envisioned by John D. Rockefeller III, Matsumoto, and others for the intellectual exchange was gradually diverging from its original conception, shaped not only by shifts in international politics resulting from the intensification of the Cold War, but also by individual-level factors such as difficulties in securing commitments from intellectuals and specific program demands from prospective visitors. The following section examines the impact that Norman Cousins—selected in accordance with the intentions discussed above—had on the Japan−U.S. IIP.

II: Norman Cousins' Visit to Japan and the "Hiroshima Maidens" Relief Project

1. The Distinctive Features of Cousins' Itinerary

Selected as one of the American delegates, Norman Cousins stayed in Japan for approximately one month, from September 6 to October 6, 1953.[42] This marked his third visit to the country. During his stay, he traveled to Tokyo, Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Nara, and Osaka.[43] In addition to meeting with key Japanese figures involved in the IIP, such as Takagi Yasaka and

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Collections, Charles E. Young Library, University of California Los Angeles, California, Los Angeles (hereafter, NCP).

39. Kokusai Bunka Kaikan, *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan jūnen no ayumi 1952−nen 4−gatsu−1962−nen 3−gatsu* (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Kaikan, 1963), 33.

40. Norman Cousins, "Norman Cousins to Harry J. Carman," February 16, 1953, Cataloged Correspondence, Cousins, Norman To Carman, 1952−1954, 3 t.1.s., HJCP.

41. Ibid.

42. Katō, *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan gojūnen no ayumi*, 357.

43. "Schedule for Dr. and Mrs. Norman Cousins' Trip to Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Nara and Osaka," n.d., Box 330, Folder 4, Japan−1953, NCP.

Matsumoto Shigeharu, Cousins also held meetings with high-ranking officials, including then-Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru.[44] His itinerary included not only lectures at universities and meetings with political leaders, but also opportunities to observe traditional Japanese performing arts such as Kabuki. Given that his schedule closely resembled that of Charles W. Cole, President of Amherst College, who had visited Japan earlier that January under the same program, it is likely that these activities constituted a standard itinerary arranged by the Japanese Committee for intellectual exchange delegates.[45]

Relatively few newspapers reported on Cousins' visit to Japan and the events he attended. To the best of this author's knowledge, among the five major national newspapers (*Yomiuri*, *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Nikkei*, *Sankei*), only the *Asahi shinbun* and *Mainichi shinbun* carried articles on Cousins, and even in those cases, the coverage was limited in scope and often confined to brief notices.[46] In contrast, it was regional newspapers—such as the *Chugoku shinbun*—that provided consistent, day-to-day reporting on his itinerary. This heightened local interest can likely be attributed to Cousins' prior involvement in Hiroshima through the Moral Adoption Program.

It is worthwhile to reconstruct, as far as possible from available sources, the details of Cousins' itinerary in Hiroshima. Norman Cousins and his wife arrived in Hiroshima late at night on September 22, 1953, coming from Nagasaki. According to the *Chugoku shinbun*, a large crowd welcomed them despite the late hour, and Cousins held a press conference shortly thereafter.[47] The person who escorted the couple into the city was Reverend Tanimoto Kiyoshi, the Japanese partner of the Moral Adoption Program. That evening, Tanimoto persuaded the couple to attend a gathering at his church the following night, where the so-called "Hiroshima Maidens" would be present.[48] On September 23, *Chugoku shinbun* reported on a ceremony of gratitude held at Honkawa Elementary School, where 410 moral adoptees expressed their gratitude to Cousins.[49] That evening, the couple visited the Nagarekawa Church to meet with the "Hiroshima Maidens."[50]

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44. Ibid.

45. Fujita, *Amerika bunka gaikō*, 211−13. Despite the inclusion of traditional cultural experiences in his itinerary, what captured Cousins's interest—and was later featured in an editorial in *The Saturday Review*—was the emerging gambling culture of Pachinko.

46. "Nōman Kazunzu-shi fūsai no resepushon," *Mainichi shinbun*, October 6, 1953; "Nōman Kazunzu-shi no atarashii musuko," *Asahi shinbun* (*chōkan*), October 5, 1953; "Kazunzu-shi mo," *Asahi shinbun* (*chōkan*), September 7, 1953.

47. "Kokyō ni kaetta yōda: N. Kazunzu-shi fusai Hōkō," *Chugoku shinbun* (*yūkan*), September 24, 1953.

48. Rodney Barker, *The Hiroshima Maidens: A Story of Courage, Compassion, and Survival* (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1985), 64−65.

49. "Kōno-kun hasande kangeki," *Chugoku shinbun* (*chōkan*), September 24, 1953.

50. Barker, *The Hiroshima Maidens*, 64−65.

On September 24, after making an excursion to Miyajima, Cousins visited the Hiroshima War Orphans Foster Home and later met again with the "Hiroshima Maidens" at the Peace Center in the afternoon. Cousins also gave a lecture at Hiroshima University on the theme of "World Community and Peace."[51] On September 25, his final day in Hiroshima, Cousins visited several orphanages across the city, delivered a lecture for a local PTA at an elementary school, and attended a meeting at the Peace Center.[52] That day concluded with a roundtable discussion with a women's organization—identified in handwritten notes as "Hiroshima Women's College"—after which they departed for Kyoto.[53]

Cousins' itinerary in Hiroshima can broadly be categorized into two types of activities. The first involved academic and intellectual exchange, including his lecture at Hiroshima University, meetings with local PTA groups, and a roundtable with a women's organization. The second encompassed humanitarian programs related to the Moral Adoption Program and the relief efforts for the "Hiroshima Maidens." While a strict distinction is difficult—for instance, the theme of Cousins' lecture at Hiroshima University clearly reflected his lifelong advocacy for world federalism—what is most significant here is the way in which a privately driven initiative, one in which Cousins had long been personally engaged, came to be integrated into the broader framework of the IIP initially outlined by figures such as John D. Rockefeller III and Matsumoto Shigeharu. His activities in Hiroshima suggest that the Japan–U.S. IIP allowed for a degree of agency on the part of individual participants, enabling them to shape the program in ways that reflected their own diplomatic or humanitarian agendas.

However, commemorating or praising the Moral Adoption Program implicitly entailed a critique of the U.S. occupation policy and the State Department's stance of nontreatment toward *hibakusha*. One of the major catalysts for Cousins' advocacy of this initiative was his 1949 visit to Hiroshima, where he was confronted with the dire conditions of the city and began to question the approach of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), which studied *hibakusha* without providing them with medical treatment. Indeed, in a 1949 editorial of *The Saturday Review* reflecting on his visit to Hiroshima, Cousins criticized the ABCC, writing: "I thought of the millions of dollars being spent by the United States in Hiroshima in the work of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission. [...] Nothing of those millions goes to treat the victims of the atomic bomb. The Casualty Commission only examines patients; it doesn't treat them."[54]

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51. "Schedule for Dr. and Mrs. Norman Cousins' Trip to Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Nara and Osaka," n.d., Box 330, Folder 4, Japan–1953, NCP.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Norman Cousins, "Hiroshima Four Years Later," *The Saturday Review*, September 17, 1949, 10.

While it is true that the Moral Adoption Program, from its inception, carried implicit criticism of the U.S. government, there is no evidence to suggest that it provoked any backlash from American authorities or the Occupation administration. On the contrary, Cousins himself later acknowledged that he had launched the initiative at the suggestion of General MacArthur.[55] As Uchiwa Masashi has argued, it is highly likely that the Moral Adoption Program was implemented in a way that complemented, rather than contradicted, Occupation policy.[56] Within the context of the Japan–U.S. IIP, the commemoration of the Moral Adoption Program embodied a "dual message": on the one hand, a subtle critique of American policy; on the other, an expression of praise for a humanitarian undertaking led by private American citizens.

2. The Japan–U.S. IIP and the Origins of the "Hiroshima Maidens" Relief Initiative

During his visit to Hiroshima, Cousins took the initiative to engage in a more proactive humanitarian effort for atomic bomb survivors—specifically, what would become known as the "Hiroshima Maidens" project, aimed at supporting young women who had been severely injured by the atomic bombing. As noted earlier, Cousins was first approached on this issue by Reverend Tanimoto Kiyoshi of the Nagarekawa Church in Hiroshima, who had previously collaborated with him on the Moral Adoption Program. Following a meeting with the "Hiroshima Maidens," Cousins made the decisive commitment to bring them to the United States to receive reconstructive surgery. As historian Kawaguchi Yūko, who has studied Tanimoto's role and the postwar international dissemination of the Hiroshima narrative, has observed, "Cousins's engagement with the issue laid the foundation for what would later become a widely recognized treatment project in the United States."[57]

The fact that Cousins was able to advance the "Hiroshima Maidens" project—a highly sensitive initiative that was expected to provoke domestic opposition within the United States (indeed, the U.S. State Department vigorously attempted to obstruct the "Hiroshima Maidens" travel to America)—within the framework of the Japan–U.S. IIP marks a significant departure from the conventional portrayal of the program as a "static" enterprise, limited to lectures and meetings between

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55. Kawamoto Kazuyuki, "Hiroshima seishin yōshi dai ni bu ima mo 'waga ko' kizukau Beikoku no oya," Chugoku Shinbun Hiroshima Heiwa Media Sentā. https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=21073.

56. Uchiwa, "Seishinteki yōshi," 9–10.

57. Kawaguchi Yūko, "Hiroshima no 'ekkyō': Senryōki no Nichibei ni okeru Tanimoto Kiyoshi no Hiroshima Pīsu Sentā setsuritsu katsudō." PhD diss., University of Tokyo (2013), 233.

delegates and local stakeholders. Moreover, the fact that the "Hiroshima Maidens" relief initiative gained full momentum within the structure of the intellectual interchange has not been previously addressed in existing scholarship on Cousins. The discussion thus far suggests that the Japan–U.S. IIP was not merely a "citizen exchange" initiative conducted by intellectuals, but rather a complex academic-political project shaped and inflected by the personal political agendas of individual participants.

How, then, did the Japanese members of the IIP respond to the increasingly political initiatives that Cousins was advancing? In brief, it appears that members of the Japanese Committee generally did not regard these developments as problematic. From the outset, the Japanese side had approved the inclusion of a visit to Hiroshima in Cousins' itinerary to commemorate the Moral Adoption Program. It is true that the Moral Adoption Program took a critical stance toward American policy and thus represented something of a departure from the original concept of the intellectual interchange. Yet, as discussed earlier, its "dual message" provided the Japanese Committee with a way to incorporate the initiative into the framework of intellectual exchange. In other words, what might be seen as Cousins' "anti-American" project could be reframed as an exemplary case of American private humanitarianism. Furthermore, it is evident that the Japanese Committee was aware of meetings held in Hiroshima between Cousins and local figures such as Reverend Tanimoto to discuss future plans. At a council on atomic bomb survivor relief, attendees included Tanimoto representing the Peace Center, William C. Moloney as Deputy Director of the ABCC, and Deputy Mayor Sakata Shuichi on behalf of the city, with the journalist Mukai Hideo participating as a member of the Intellectual Interchange Committee—a fact that suggests the committee's involvement.[58] In Moloney's diary, Tanimoto raised further ideas regarding survivor relief, indicating that highly political issues were indeed being deliberated in the very midst of the IIP.[59]

Interestingly, for local actors in Hiroshima, the IIP appears to have held quite different meanings from that of a straightforward international academic exchange. Even before Cousins' visit, Hiroshima stakeholders like Tanimoto were actively seeking to leverage the IIP for their own initiatives. In June of that year, Reverend Tanimoto approached Eleanor Roosevelt, who was visiting Japan as part of the Japan–U.S. IIP, asking her to support the planned "Hiroshima Maidens" project. Tanimoto believed that as the wife of Franklin Delano

58. "Medical Care for A-Bomb Wounded Shussekishahyō," n.d., Box 330, Folder 4, Japan–1953, NCP.

59. William C. Moloney, "Diary of Moloney July 1953–September 1953," September 27, 1953, William C. Moloney, M.D. Papers, Texas Medical Center Library, Texas. https://digitalcommons.library.tmc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=3&article=1000&context=moloneyjournal&type=additional.

Roosevelt—the very president who had initiated the atomic bomb project—she might feel compelled to respond proactively, and he arranged for her to meet with several of the "Hiroshima Maidens."[60] However, Eleanor Roosevelt, while expressing general sympathy, remained reluctant to endorse the *hibakusha* relief initiative in any concrete way. Consequently, Tanimoto turned to Cousins, who already had an established track record through the Moral Adoption Program. This dynamic reveals the historical complexity of the Japan–U.S. Intellectual Interchange: despite the broad vision articulated by figures like John D. Rockefeller III and Matsumoto Shigeharu—who conceived of it as a venue for Cold War–era intellectual dialogue between Japan and the United States—the program also functioned, at the local level, as an arena for petitioning and advocacy.

III: What Did Norman Cousins Articulate in the Japan–U.S. Intellectual Interchange?

1. Sharing "Revisionist" Perspectives on the Atomic Bombings

In the preceding section, I demonstrated both the distinctive character of Cousins' itinerary in Hiroshima and the presence of his private diplomacy within the framework of the IIP. This raises the question: During his visit, as he resolved to advance the "Hiroshima Maidens" initiative, what did Cousins articulate, and what views did he share with his Japanese counterparts?

Although Cousins visited Japan in his capacity as a literary critic, it seems clear that for him, questions of peace and literature were inseparable. At a meeting of the University of Tokyo English Literature Society, when President Yanaihara advocated for the necessity of U.S.–Soviet rapprochement, Cousins countered by criticizing the Soviet Union, asserting that "America is extending its hand, but the Soviet Union refuses to take it."[61] The published record of the meeting even cautions that "the discussion became highly political".[62] *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan jūnen no ayumi* similarly recalls that among the visitors participating in the IIP, Cousins was particularly outspoken in offering recommendations on issues of peace and politics.[63]

The topics Cousins addressed in his lectures at universities in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and elsewhere included "World Community and Peace," "Future Relations between Japan and America," and "On Construction of the

60. Barker, *The Hiroshima Maidens*, 64.

61. "Nōman Kazunzu-shi o kakonde," *Eigo seinen*, vol. 99, no. 12 (1951): 629.

62. Ibid.

63. Kokusai Bunka Kaikan, *Kokusai Bunka Kaikan jūnen no ayumi 1952–nen 4–gatsu–1962–nen 3–gatsu*, 33.

International Cultural City and A-Bomb Issues."[64] While I will discuss in greater detail later his concluding lecture, "Some Guesses About the Future," I will first examine how the issue of the atomic bombings was debated and discussed with his Japanese audience in the context of these other lecture topics.

As a premise, it is important to note—as Shigesawa Atsuko has pointed out—that Cousins was the first to publicly articulate a "revisionist" interpretation of the atomic bombings in the spring of 1946, highlighting their diplomatic dimension vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.[65] Through his practical engagement with the Moral Adoption Program in 1949, he further consolidated this critical perspective. During his visit to Japan as part of the IIP, Cousins continued to raise these issues in discussions with Japanese audiences. One notable example is his informal conversation with faculty members following his lecture at Nagasaki University, a scene he would later describe in his January 9, 1954, editorial in *The Saturday Review*, titled "Nagasaki's Magic Mountain." In that piece, he writes:

> The memoirs of Secretary Stimson, Secretary Forrestal, and General Eisenhower have thrown a new light on the decision to drop the bomb. On August 9, three days after the Hiroshima bomb, there was no doubt about the fact that Japan would surrender. The only doubt concerned the circumstances of the surrender. America wanted no discussion about terms or anything else. We wanted absolute surrender and we wanted it within a matter of hours, and the bomb of Nagasaki was designed to achieve just that, which it did.[66]

Drawing on the memoirs of senior officials, Cousins once again condemned the atomic bombings as unnecessary acts, arguing in particular that the bombing of Nagasaki had been carried out to "pressure" Japan. In response, a Japanese faculty member at Nagasaki University remarked to Cousins that "History now knows that Japan asked for peace terms even before Hiroshima was bombed."[67] He then pointed out explicitly that although Japan had disarmed and adopted a pacifist constitution in compliance with American directives after the war, it was now facing American pressure to rearm. The lecturer pointedly added, "If the reason for your bombing of Nagasaki was to get Japan to agree to do the very things you now say was a mistake, then that can only mean that you acknowledge

64. "Itinerary for Mr. and Mrs. Norman Cousins," n.d., Box 330, Folder 4, Japan−1953, NCP.

65. Shigesawa Atsuko, "Bei senryaku bakugeki chōsadan hōkokusho no 'genbaku fuyōron': Genbaku tōka ronsō no kenkyūshi kara miru sono yakuwari to igi," *Hiroshima kokusai kenkyū*, vol. 19 (2013): 1−19.

66. Norman Cousins, "Nagasaki's Magic Mountain," *The Saturday Review*, January 9, 1954, 23−24.

67. Ibid., 24.

that the bombing of Nagasaki was a mistake, too."[68] This exchange can be seen as a typical expression of the intellectual unease surrounding the Reverse Course in Japan's postwar trajectory. Cousins fully endorsed the lecturer's view, using it to appeal to his readers for the urgent need to define a clear direction for American diplomacy.

Naturally, both Cousins' own interpretation of the atomic bombings and the perspective shared by the Japanese lecturer diverged significantly from the official position of the U.S. government. As noted earlier, it was precisely this "revisionist" view of the atomic bombings advanced by Cousins that so infuriated American officials and provoked the production of a "counter-narrative" justifying the atomic bombing. The dissemination of such discourse within the framework of the Japan–U.S. IIP thus threatened to undermine the very premise of the initiative, which was designed to keep Japan firmly aligned with the Western bloc. Therefore, the fact that Cousins offered such proactive and pointed interventions on an extremely sensitive aspect of the bilateral relationship fundamentally challenges the conventional portrayal of the intellectual interchange as a primarily pro-American exercise.

2. Cousins' Proposals for International Relations

Next, I will analyze the lecture Cousins delivered on October 5, 1953, at The America–Japan Society, titled "Some Guesses About the Future."[69] Although Cousins also gave a talk at International Christian University on the following day, October 6—his final day in Japan—to the best of this author's knowledge, the October 5 lecture is the last for which any textual record survives. Moreover, given that this lecture served as the culmination of his visit and addressed a wide range of subjects, including the Cold War, Japan–U.S. relations, and issues related to the United Nations, it represents an especially appropriate subject for analysis.

The lecture can be broadly divided into three thematic sections: Japan–U.S. relations, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations and world law. Its contents can be summarized as follows.[70] At the outset, Cousins offered brief introductory remarks in which he expressed gratitude for the widespread recognition he had received within Japan—including an acknowledgment from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru himself—for his philanthropic work on the Moral Adoption Program. In the section on Japan–U.S. relations, he remarked that despite the tensions surrounding issues such as the Reverse Course he had encountered no anti-American sentiment during his stay. He further suggested that Americans

68. Ibid., 24.

69. Norman Cousins, "Some Guesses About the Future," October 5, 1953, Box 122, NCP.

70. Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of the speech in this paragraph is based primarily on "Some Guesses About the Future."

should not take offense at legitimate criticism. He went on to praise Japan's postwar reconstruction and also highlighted the generosity of the American Occupation's treatment of a defeated nation. Turning to the Soviet Union, Cousins advanced the idea that Soviet policy had two primary objectives: first, to block any attempts by other nations to unite, and second, to ensure that the Soviet Union itself remained integrated within the global community. He warned that in this way the Soviet Union sought to avoid both total peace and total war while pursuing ambitions to consolidate its position in Asia—a region characterized by revolutions and political upheaval. In the section on the United Nations and international law, Cousins argued for the need to reform the United Nations into an institution capable of enforcing world law. He maintained that only a UN backed by both physical power and the moral weight of global public opinion would be able to contain Soviet ambitions. Finally, addressing contemporary debates about Japan's rearmament, he concluded that maintaining military power in service of peace under a strengthened United Nations would not only protect Japan's sovereignty but also contribute to global peace.

An analysis of this lecture reveals, first and foremost, that its structure closely mirrors the arguments Cousins had been advancing since the atomic bombings. As noted earlier, profoundly affected by the bombing of Hiroshima, he came to emphasize the inherent inadequacy of national security in the atomic age and advocated for the creation of a world federation as the path to peace. Even after the failure of the United Nations' atomic energy control plan at the end of 1946 eliminated any realistic political prospect for such a federalist direction, Cousins continued to champion the idea of world federalism. The vision of the United Nations he described in his lecture—an institution endowed with both military power and moral authority—was essentially identical to his concept of a world federation: one without a Security Council-style veto, possessing the coercive enforcement powers of a true world government. Accordingly, in this lecture, as he had consistently argued in *The Saturday Review*, Cousins presented world federalism as the ultimate solution to international problems.

Next, and related to the preceding point, one notable feature of this lecture is Cousins' endorsement of an internationalist approach in American foreign policy—an approach he welcomed and also urged upon his Japanese audience. In his remarks, Cousins referenced President Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" speech of April 16, 1953, suggesting that while American diplomacy had previously lost its sense of direction, it was now moving toward strengthening the United Nations in a promising way. He further challenged the claims made by commentators in developing nations and Japan who argued that Eisenhower's initiative was merely an attempt to consolidate a Western bloc within the UN.

From these considerations, it becomes clear that, despite his forceful criticisms of U.S. diplomacy over the atomic bombings, Cousins envisioned Japan's future foreign policy as one that should proceed in partnership with the United States

through the strengthening of the United Nations. He rejected as unrealistic the then-emerging intellectual currents in Japan that favored closer ties with the Eastern bloc or a posture of neutrality. He warned that the Soviet Union did not seek total war but rather aimed to expand its influence by exploiting ongoing instability in various regions. To counter this, he argued, required a suitably strengthened United Nations capable of "containment."

Cousins fiercely condemned the moral failure embodied in the atomic bombings and sought to atone for it through acts of "private diplomacy" within the framework of the IIP. Yet despite these critiques, the fact that he ultimately stressed a Western-oriented partnership with the United States through the strengthening of the United Nations as Japan's diplomatic path forward reveals both the distinctive character and the inherent limitations of his thinking.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on Norman Cousins' visit to Japan under the auspices of the Japan–U.S. IIP, examining the process by which he was selected, the details of his itinerary, and the content of his lectures. Previous scholarship has rarely considered the ideological continuity and influence of intellectuals as "private" actors who were supposed to be central agents of such interchange. Yet Cousins' case vividly illustrates the significance of these "private" actors within the program. His itinerary and speeches in Japan, along with the initiation of a new relief effort for atomic bomb survivors during his visit, clearly demonstrate the strong continuity with his earlier practices of private diplomacy.

Finally, I turn to the research questions that remain to be addressed. It is necessary to clarify the actual workings of the Japan–U.S. IIP during the mid-and-late Cold War era—from the 1960s, when it was taken over by the International House of Japan, through to its conclusion in the 1990s. Understanding what political role this now fully developed interchange initiative played during the Vietnam War era of the 1960s or the period of the deepening Japan–U.S. alliance in the 1970s constitutes one of the most pressing questions in this field. In pursuing this line of inquiry, as this paper has repeatedly emphasized, it will be essential to focus on the "individuals" involved—those who traveled between Japan and the United States as part of these intellectual exchange programs.